It looks like emerging market investors took my last post (“Investors” Shouldn’t Worry about the Euro) to heart, since emerging markets (EM) have continued to rally in spite of the Euro’s woes. To be sure, EM stocks, bonds, and currencies all dipped slightly in May when the crisis reached fever pitch, but they have since recovered their losses and are once again en route to record highs.

MSCI Stock Index 2010

That’s not to say that that surge in risk-aversion wasn’t justified. In fact, investors are continuing to punish the Eurozone as well as a handful of other risky areas. However, analysts have concluded that in the case of emerging markets as a whole, this mindset doesn’t really make sense.

Simply, the fiscal and economic condition of is stronger than in developing countries. Whereas previously crises were known to originate in developing countries and spread to industrialized countries, this latest series of crisis turned that notion on its head. The credit and housing crises were largely the product of speculation in the West, and the sovereign debt crisis originated in Europe. While it’s possible that investor concern would self-fulfillingly cause the crisis to spread to emerging markets, any impact would probably be muted.

EMBI+ bond index 2011
As far as forex investors are concerned, the confidence in EM capital markets should also extend to currencies. The carry trade is heating up (thanks to the cheap Euro), and will probably only expand as EM Central Banks move to raise interest rates to combat inflation, as alluded to above. If the Eurozone debt crisis intensifies, then you can expect some kind of pull-back. As with recent retracements, however, it will be only temporary.

EUR USD 3 months 2010
The arguments in favor of the former are pretty strong. Namely, EUR/USD bearish sentiment had expanded to such an extreme level that a pullback – temporary or permanent – was basically inevitable. From this standpoint, what we have seen unfold over the last month-and-a-half is a classic short squeeze. Basically, those who were short the Euro were forced to cover their positions when it started to rally, which in turn triggered more selling, and ultimately, a self-fulfilling rally. As a result, “The difference in the number of wagers by hedge funds and other large speculators on a decline in the euro compared with those on a gain dropped to 38,909 on July 6, compared with record net shorts of 113,890 on May 11.”

Due to its sudden rise, the Euro became a much less attractive funding currency for carry traders. It helps that other Central Banks are delaying interest rate hikes, which means it’s difficult to turn a solid profit (on a risk-adjusted basis) from shorting the Euro. In addition, the markets have started to turn their attention to economic fundamentals in the US, which had been edging out the Euro in one of the perennially important rivalries in currency markets. In short, it suddenly became obvious to traders that the economic and fiscal conditions in the US are at best equal to those in the EU.

Finally, there was an implicit acknowledgement among the EU leadership that the so-called sovereign debt crisis is actually in many ways a banking crisis. This admission came in the form of stress-tests on 91 of the EU’s largest banks, designed to determine their exposure to sovereign debt and placate investors. After all, “It was German and French banks that led the way in lending to Greece or Spain.” This misjudgement has spurred such banks to set aside Billions in potential losses and vastly curtail their lending activities.

Unfortunately, investors are skeptical that the stress tests will be stringent enough, seeing them as a mere publicity stunt: “While the EU have tried to counter these suspicions by promising to publish the result of stress tests, the market is fearful that stress tests will force some banks into writing down losses on non-performing loans.” By extension, investors are still equally concerned about the possibility of a sovereign debt default, even one that it is only partial.

In other words, the consensus is that despite the EU’s best efforts to tackle the crisis, it still has yet to enact meaningful structural reforms, opting instead for short-term stopgap solutions. According to The Economist, “The debate about how to save Europe’s single currency from disintegration is stuck…because the euro zone’s dominant powers, France and Germany, agree on the need for greater harmonisation within the euro zone, but disagree about what to harmonise.” There remains a lack of agreement over whether the economically and fiscally weaker members of the EU will be allowed to remain members, and if so, what if anything will be done to keep them in line.

EU Public Debt

As you can see from the chart above, time is quickly running out. For the majority of EU countries, debt is now rising faster than GDP. From the standpoint of many investors, default seems like the most likely outcome since such countries lack the political muster to reduce their budget deficits, nor can they devalue their debt through currency depreciation, due to the common currency.

Thus, the consensus (for now) is that the Euro’s run will soon come to an end. According to Citigroup, “The euro will resume its decline and head toward the $1.10-$1.15 range. ‘The market has digested a lot of the bad news about the euro. There’s no great optimism.’ ” Meanwhile, BNP Paribas “expects the euro to fall to parity by the end of 2010—one euro per dollar—a level it hasn’t seen since December 2002…[and] drift to 97 cents before hitting bottom in the third quarter of 2011.”

The recent blow-up surrounding the downgrade of Greece’s debt and subsequent explosion in the price of credit default swaps (which insure against default), have shined a spotlight on the fiscal problems of many of the EU’s member states, including Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and others. The situation in Japan, meanwhile, has been much more gradual, though equally dangerous: “In 1990, Japan’s total national debt load was 390% of GDP. Now it’s 460%. In the interim, the country has suffered sub-par growth and routine recessions.”

The fiscal problems of the US and UK governments as well as the debts of their citizens and companies have long been famous. For that reason, when the sick/healthy paradigm was first proposed, they were the two most obvious candidates. Having conducted some additional analysis, it’s now patently obvious that the same problems affect the EU and Japan. Given that their economies are also in weak shape, it doesn’t really make sense to group them in with the healthy currencies. Canada (and the Loonie, by extension) is also looking sickly, with its surging national debt and record budget deficits. The only reason it is being spared from the list is because of its richness in natural resources; in other words, it has something tangible that it can use to pay its debts.

Among the so-called majors, then, only the Swiss Franc, Canadian Loonie, Australian Dollar, and New Zealand Dollar get clean bills of health. A re-casting of the paradigm, then, would put the super-majors (Euro, Yen, Pound, and Dollar account for more than 75% of all foreign exchange activity) on one side, and virtually every other currency on the other. Given that national debt ratios and interest rate differentials diverge across the same boundary, it’s not hard to conjure a basis for this partition. “The IMF forecasts that gross government debt among advanced economies will continue to rise until 2014, reaching 114% of GDP, compared to just 35% for developing nations.” Adds another analyst: “If you look at currencies as a proxy for growth, then you can anticipate that emerging-market currencies will appreciate against the dollar.”

P135_G20
There is also a correction that is taking place within the group of sick currencies. Investors have come to realize belatedly that a Dollar sell-off doesn’t make any sense against the Euro and Yen, whose economic and fiscal situations could hardly be characterized as healthy. “Against the majors, we’re pretty close to the end, if we haven’t already reached the end of a bear market in the dollar,” asserted one analyst. Given that the Dollar’s demise had all but been taken for granted, this reconsideration isn’t coming natural. Volatility has surged to a 3-month high, and investors are responding by moving funds back to the US. Among the majors, then, it looks like the Dollar is still the “least worst” currency.

While the Obama administration has pledged the kind of fiscal responsibility that would secure its government obligations, its actions haven’t been so responsible. The Fed recently announced purchases of $1 Trillion in government debt, while the government is set to rack up Trillion-Dollar deficits over the next decade, even by the most conservative estimates.

In other words, China is in a quandary; stop lending to the US, and you might see the value of your existing reserves plummet. Continue lending, and you risk the same result. Tired of participating in this apparent no-win situation, China is finally taking action.

First, it will petition the G20 at its upcoming meeting for some level of protection on its $1 Trillion+ “investment” in the US. Meanwhile, Zhou XiaoChuan, governor of the Central Bank of China, has authored a paper calling for a decline in the role that individual currencies play in international trade and finance. According to Mr. Zhou, “Most nations concentrate their assets in those reserve currencies [Dollar, Euro, Yen], which exaggerates the size of flows and makes financial systems overall more volatile.” His point is well-taken, since of the $4.5 Trillion in global foreign exchange reserves that can be identified, perhaps 85% are accounted for by Euros and Dollars alone. When crises occur, everyone flocks to these currencies.

Mr. Zhou’s proposal is not without precedent. “His idea is to expand the use of ’special drawing rights,’ or SDRs — a kind of synthetic currency created by the IMF in the 1960s. Its value is determined by a basket of major currencies. Originally, the SDR was intended to serve as a shared currency for international reserves, though that aspect never really got off the ground.” It’s not clear exactly how such a system would work, but the idea is straightforward enough; instead of holding individual currencies, which are inherently volatile, Central Banks would be able to denominate reserves in a sort of universal currency. Instead of parking money in US Treasury securities, they would hold IMF bonds, or some equivalent.

Even before China starting becoming more vocal about its concerns, analysts had begun questioning the role of the US as reserve currency. I’m not just talking about the perennial pessimists. Within the context of the current credit crisis, a bubble may be forming in the market for Treasury bonds. “Foreign buying of American financial assets by both private investors and governments averaged $141 billion from September to December, Treasury data show…Demand was so strong that, for the first time, investors accepted rates below 0 percent on three-month Treasury bills to safeguard their capital.”

There is concern that a slight recovery in risk appetite (of which there is already evidence) could ignite a massive sell-off: “People are sitting there holding massive amounts of zero- yielding dollar assets. If there is any sort of good news, demand for dollars can drop off very, very quickly.”

Simply put, backtesting involves applying a trading strategy to historical data. In other words, by checking the parameters that normally guide your trading against the way markets actually performed in the past, you can easily determine the stipulations/conditions that will make such parameters robust. Parameters include time period (hours, days, weeks, etc.), expected profit per trade (percentage, or number of pips), cumulative profit goal (i.e. 25% annual return) currency pair (USD/EUR, EUR/YEN, etc.) and comfort with risk (i.e. stop/loss). Stipulations, on the other hand, can be as simple or as complicated as you would like. For example, let’s say you want to buy whenever the currency pair breaches its 15-day moving average, and/or sell when the stochastic falls below a certain threshold. These kinds of stipulations can also be qualitative; let’s say, for example, you sell the Euro every time the European Central Bank lowers interest rates, or buy the Dollar every time the consumer confidence index records a rise.

The most robust strategies are profitable under a variety of market conditions, when profit goals are flexible. (For example, try adding or subtracting 5 pips to your expected profit per trade, and see if your strategy is still profitable). It is also important to remember that some strategies don’t lend themselves well to backtesting. Trendlines and other technical ‘patterns,’ for example, are often too circumstantial to be applied and tested generally. Backtesting also doesn’t account for market psyschology. While it would be nice to devise a strategy that is profitable in a variety of conditions, sometimes it must be condeded that when market sentiment is especially (and often irrationally) bullish or bearish, one’s strategy may not apply.

Having developed the paramaters and stipulations, how can you backtest your strategy? The pioneers (and perhaps even some stalwarts today) manually parsed reams of data, going through daily and weekly charts to determine the sets of conditions, if any, their strategies were viable. With the use of powerful computers, this tedious process can be completed automatically. If you’re not up for building/coding a system yourself, don’t despair, as there are a handful of great programs that have been professionally designed for amateurs to use.

Here, you have two main options. You can open a (demo) account with any of the forex brokers that incorporate backtesting software into their trading platforms. Pay special attention to those that use MetaTrader4 (MT4) – of which there are several reputable brokers- because it is the most critically-acclaimed and user-friendly. For those of you who don’t have access to such software, several downloadable versions can be found here, and a quick google search turned up a list of commercial software. Sometimes, such software requires you to provide your own historical data, which can be found here.

The New Zealand Dollar illustrates this trend perfectly. For most of 2008, it collapsed as investors pulled money from risky, high-yielding currencies, in favor of a capital preservation strategy: accepting limited or zero return in exchange for security. Beginning at the tail-end of last year, however, it stabilized around the psychological level of .5 USD/NZD, failing to breach the important technical level of .4915.

While such technical factors undoubtedly have played a role in the reversal of fortune, the NZD has benefited by the aggressive interest rate cuts effected by the Bank of New Zealand, which today cut its benchmark rate yet again by 50 basis points, to 3%. While it’s too early to speculate whether the Central Bank will cut rates again at its next meeting, all signs point to further cuts. The economy is in a paltry state, having contracted for five consecutive quarters. Chinese demand for commodities is abating quickly, and the most recent numbers suggest it will continue to erode.

Based on investors’ current priorities, however, the most important indicator is the monetary situation, which appears under control. “The expectation that the RBNZ will be more moderate with cuts going ahead has provided support to the currency.” said…a currency strategist at Bank of New Zealand…“For a sustained bounce above 52 U.S. cents we’ll have to see an improvement in the global backdrop and evidence that equity markets have stopped falling and risk appetite is rebounding.”

Re-balancing means that Asian countries must stop piling up ever-rising forex reserves (and trade surpluses). Such reserves represent excessive saving, excessive exports and insufficient imports.

The illusion has since been shattered, and it seems investors are trying to overcompensate for their previous naivete. Yields on government bonds for all five countries have begun to creep up, and a handful of speculators are betting on the possibility of default. Most experts insist that such a scenario is unlikely, but at the very least, the credit crisis has exposed the chinks in the armor of the EU, demonstrating that the currency also has its drawbacks.

While sharing a currency with some of the mightiest economies in the world helped Europe’s poorer nations share in the wealth, a boon during boom times, in hard times the rules of membership are keeping them from doing what countries normally do to ride out economic storms, including enormous spending.

What happened, in effect, was rapid economic isolation. This began as investors moved money from more risky regional stock and currency markets into safer, often euro-denominated, assets, in what economists call a “flight to quality.”